

Addressing Violence and Gun Crime in Tallahassee and Leon County, Florida Through the Multi-Agency Capital Region Real Time Crime Center: An Operational and Research Partnership

Final Report to the Bureau of Justice Assistance Smart Policing Initiative

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This project reflects the value of collaborative partnerships between researchers and practitioners in advancing evidence-informed approaches to policing. By combining operational expertise from law enforcement agencies with independent research and analysis, the project sought to provide practical insights into the implementation and potential effects of real time crime center operations.

Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary	4
2. Targeted Problem.....	8
3. Interagency Collaboration.....	10
4. Strategies Employed	14
4.1 Key Strategies Undertaken to Address the Crime Problem.....	14
4.2 Innovations Employed Throughout SPI.....	19
5. Data and Intelligence	21
5.1 Development and Integration of Data Resources	22
5.2 Operational Intelligence Production	23
5.3 Use of Intelligence by Officers and Deputies	23
5.4 Regional Intelligence Sharing, Operational Learning, and Research	24
6. Analysis and Evaluation	26
6.1 Community Awareness and Perceptions of Law Enforcement Technologies.....	26
6.2 RTCC Operations and Activity Patterns.....	31
6.3 Impact of the RTCC on Public and Officer Safety Outcomes.....	34
6.4 Impact of Grant-Funded Camera Deployments.....	47
6.5 Qualitative Interviews with RTCC Personnel and Stakeholders	52
6.6 Public Transparency and Information Sharing	67
7. Integration and Sustainability	68
8. Summary and Conclusions	70
References.....	74
Appendix.....	75

1. Executive Summary

Leon County, Florida, has faced persistent challenges related to violent crime, firearm-related offenses, and investigations that frequently cross jurisdictional boundaries. These challenges have been compounded by the fragmented information environment in which local law enforcement agencies traditionally operated, including separate and incompatible databases, agency-specific access to investigative systems, and delays in sharing time-sensitive intelligence. In response, the Leon County Sheriff's Office (LCSO), Tallahassee Police Department (TPD), Florida State University Police Department (FSUPD), Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), and the College of Criminology and Criminal Justice (CCCJ) at Florida State University (FSU) developed the Capital Region Real Time Crime Center (CRRTCC) as a multi-agency regional intelligence center designed to improve real-time information sharing, strengthen investigative coordination, and support more timely law enforcement responses across Florida's Capital Region.

Supported through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Smart Policing Initiative (SPI), the project implemented a coordinated set of strategies intended to address these problems. These strategies included formalizing a multi-agency operational model, developing a centralized analyst workforce, implementing a structured analyst training program, expanding automatic license plate reader (ALPR) deployment, increasing shared access to investigative tools and databases, and integrating multiple data streams into a more unified operational environment. Together, these efforts were designed to move collaboration beyond informal, case-by-case information sharing and create a more sustained and structured model of regional real-time intelligence support. The project also incorporated an embedded research partnership,

allowing implementation and operations to be assessed through ongoing evaluation and reinforcing a more evidence-based approach to decision-making.

Findings from the process evaluation indicate that the CRRTCC became a routine source of analytical support across the region. Analyst after-shift reports documented substantial levels of support provided to partner agencies and outside agencies, demonstrating that collaboration was not just formal but operational. Interview findings reinforced this conclusion. Across ranks and agencies, participants consistently described improved communication, more immediate access to shared information, and fewer barriers to requesting assistance across jurisdictions. Interviewees also highlighted the importance of co-location, shared access to core systems, and the presence of analysts who could support incidents regardless of agency affiliation. Taken together, the process findings suggest that SPI strengthened the routine functioning of real-time intelligence support across participating agencies and helped institutionalize a more collaborative regional model.

The report also examines public awareness of the technologies that support CRRTCC operations and broader perceptions of law enforcement technology, which was facilitated by the embedded research partnership. Community survey findings indicate that awareness varied substantially across technologies. More visible technologies, such as body-worn cameras and other camera-based tools, were more widely recognized, while technologies that operate more in the background, including the real time crime center itself, were less familiar to many residents. At the same time, the survey showed that respondents were generally supportive of many of the technologies used by local law enforcement. These findings suggest that although some CRRTCC-related technologies remain less visible to the public, the broader technology-supported approach is generally viewed favorably.

Outcome evaluation findings were more mixed than the process findings, but the overall pattern is substantively informative and generally consistent with the CRRTCC's operational logic. The strongest evidence of impact appeared in the outcomes most closely tied to the center's real-time analytical functions. Vehicle recoveries showed one of the clearest positive patterns, with the preexisting downward trend improving after CRRTCC implementation. Motor vehicle theft also showed supportive results, shifting from a pre-implementation increase to a significant post-implementation decline. Warrant arrests likewise moved from a declining trend before CRRTCC implementation to a more positive trajectory after the center became operational.

Variation across the remaining outcomes is also informative. Several broader crime outcomes showed supportive shifts, while others showed little change. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the CRRTCC's expected role. A center of this kind would be expected to have its most direct effects on outcomes closely linked to real-time analytical support and cross-agency coordination, with weaker or less consistent effects on broader crime patterns that are shaped by many additional factors.

In addition to the broader findings on the impact of the CRRTCC as a whole, the report examines the effects of ALPR camera deployments supported by grant funding as part of the broader technology investments supporting CRRTCC operations. Although there is some evidence of a short-term increase in recorded incidents following installation, likely because of improved detection, the results do not indicate a clear immediate reduction in vehicle theft. Instead, the longer-term pattern is more favorable, suggesting that any effects of camera deployment developed gradually over time. A similar delayed pattern appears for vehicle recovery, with little evidence of immediate improvement but a more positive trend emerging

later in the post-installation period. Together, these findings suggest that camera deployments can contribute to both prevention and investigative outcomes, but that their effects develop gradually as the technology becomes more fully integrated into routine operations.

Beyond these empirical findings, the project produced important organizational impacts. The SPI experience helped institutionalize a regional model of intelligence support, formalize shared operational workflows, and contribute to a more standardized approach to analyst staffing and training across agencies. It also strengthened the integration of technologies and databases that had previously been more fragmented and helped agencies identify and address interoperability problems, workflow inefficiencies, and access gaps that became visible during implementation. The embedded research partnership further strengthened the connection between operations and evaluation, creating a foundation for continued evidence-based refinement of CRRTCC policies, workflows, and technologies over time, which can be documented and shared with other law enforcement agencies.

Several lessons emerged from the project that may be useful for agencies considering similar initiatives. First, successful multi-agency RTCC operations require more than co-location or shared interest. They depend on governance, shared access to core systems, clearly defined workflows, and sustained coordination across agencies. Second, staffing and training are just as important as technology. The effectiveness of the CRRTCC depended not only on analytical tools, but also on building a workforce capable of using those tools in a fast-moving, multi-agency environment and communicating useful information to officers and investigators. Third, implementation in a multi-agency setting requires ongoing adaptation. Agencies pursuing similar models should expect to devote substantial attention to data-sharing agreements, interoperability,

workflow development, and operational refinement rather than treating those issues as secondary to technology acquisition.

Overall, the findings indicate that the SPI project supported meaningful organizational change and encouraging outcome improvements in several areas that are most closely tied to the CRRTCC's intended functions. The CRRTCC strengthened regional collaboration, expanded the routine use of real-time data and intelligence in active incidents and investigations, and created a more durable foundation for evidence-based, multi-agency analytical support across Florida's Capital Region. The overall pattern of results is consistent with the project's theory of change and supports the continued development and evaluation of collaborative, data-informed approaches to policing that are designed to address crime problems crossing jurisdictional boundaries.

2. Targeted Problem

Leon County, Florida, with a population of nearly 300,000, has faced persistent challenges related to violent crime and firearm-related offenses. In 2017, Tallahassee ranked 60th among the 100 most dangerous cities in the United States, and Leon County recorded its highest murder rate in more than 28 years. The county also ranked near the top among Florida's 67 counties on measures of overall crime and had one of the lowest clearance rates in the state. Although violent crime declined modestly in 2018 and 2019, firearm-related offenses increased sharply from 2019 to 2020, including substantial increases in aggravated assaults and homicides involving firearms.

Crime in Leon County is also geographically concentrated. American Community Survey data indicate that a large proportion of census tracts qualify as high-poverty areas, with a meaningful share exceeding poverty rates of 50 percent. These conditions are consistent with

research showing that concentrated disadvantage is strongly associated with violent crime and help explain the importance of focused, place-based crime reduction strategies (DeCoster, Heimer, & Wittrock, 2006).

At the same time, many of the most pressing crime problems in Leon County were not confined to a single jurisdiction. Violent crime, vehicle theft, and related investigations routinely crossed jurisdictional boundaries involving the Leon County Sheriff's Office (LCSO), the Tallahassee Police Department (TPD), and the Florida State University Police Department (FSUPD). This created a structural challenge for law enforcement agencies that often needed to identify suspects, vehicles, and related incidents across multiple systems and service areas.

In August 2018, the LCSO established a single-agency real time crime center (RTCC) to enhance its investigative capacity and support active cases. The RTCC demonstrated operational value by generating investigative leads shortly after incidents were reported and by providing analytic support to partner agencies when possible. However, the single-agency model did not fully address the broader need for coordinated, multi-agency intelligence sharing across jurisdictions in the area.

At the time of the proposal for the current project, participating agencies maintained separate records management systems, camera systems, and investigative databases. Access to these systems was agency-specific, and information sharing during active incidents often required additional coordination steps. Analysts and investigators frequently had to navigate multiple vendor-based platforms independently, limiting the speed and fluidity of intelligence synthesis across jurisdictions. These conditions reduced the ability of agencies to identify suspect vehicles, link related incidents, and generate actionable leads as quickly as possible during time-sensitive investigations. Investigative timeliness therefore emerged as a central operational

problem. Although participating agencies possessed substantial technological resources, those resources were fragmented. The absence of standardized, shared access limited the collective ability of analysts to assist one another seamlessly and slowed the development of actionable intelligence in the minutes and hours immediately following an incident.

Taken together, these conditions highlighted the need for a more integrated regional approach to real-time intelligence and investigative support. The targeted problem was not simply violent crime or firearm-related offending in isolation, but the combination of serious, geographically concentrated crime problems, overlapping jurisdictions, and fragmented information systems that constrained timely, coordinated law enforcement responses across the Capital Region.

3. Interagency Collaboration

The CRRTCC operates through a collaborative governance structure in which partner agencies share responsibility for personnel, infrastructure, and operating costs. Analysts remain employees of their respective agencies, with each agency covering the salary and benefits of its assigned personnel. Infrastructure development and recurring operational expenses—including database-sharing platforms, system integrations, utilities, access fees, security, and equipment—are shared across participating partners. This structure supports the CRRTCC’s multi-agency mission by institutionalizing collaboration rather than relying on informal, case-by-case assistance.

The total recurring cost for 2023 was \$317,427, reflecting initial integration, platform, and operational expenses. Estimated recurring costs for 2024 are approximately \$72,000, as major infrastructure expenses decline and costs are distributed across participating agencies. As additional agencies onboard and shared systems stabilize, recurring costs are expected to remain

substantially lower than initial implementation expenditures. Funding from the BJA SPI grant supported technology acquisition, interface integration and standardization, the strengthening of interagency partnerships, and the evaluation of CRRTCC effectiveness. These resources supported the transition from a single-agency model to a fully operational multi-agency center.

As part of the process analysis, the research team compiled and analyzed after-shift reports completed by CRRTCC analysts. These reports document daily activity, including analyst assistance to partner agencies and to outside agencies. Aggregating these reports provides a systematic assessment of the volume and distribution of collaborative support delivered through the CRRTCC. Figure 3.1 summarizes all documented assists from January through December 2025. During this period, analysts provided 10,056 assists to the Tallahassee Police Department, 4,881 assists to the Leon County Sheriff's Office, and 462 assists to the Florida State University Police Department. An additional 293 assists were provided to external agencies. These figures reflect sustained, routine analytic support across participating jurisdictions and are consistent with the CRRTCC's multi-agency design.




Figure 3.1. CRRTCC Analyst Assists by Agency (2025)

Figure 3.2 shows monthly assists by type during 2025, distinguishing between total assists, intra-agency assists provided to analysts' home agencies, and inter-agency assists provided to other partner agencies or outside agencies. The figure indicates that assist activity was substantial throughout the year and generally increased over time, with inter-agency assistance remaining a consistent component of CRRTCC operations across months. This pattern further suggests that cross-agency support was not occasional or episodic, but a routine feature of the center's day-to-day work.




Figure 3.2. Monthly CRRTCC Assists by Type (2025)

Figure 3.3 further disaggregates assists to external agencies. The largest numbers of outside assists were provided to the U.S. Marshals Service (70), FDLE (40), and the Florida Highway Patrol (38), followed by smaller numbers of assists to the Florida A&M University Police, the FBI, Florida Fish and Wildlife, and ATF. Although external assists represent a smaller share of total activity, they demonstrate that the CRRTCC functions not only as a regional intelligence hub among core partners but also as a resource for state and federal agencies operating within or in coordination with the Capital Region.




Figure 3.3. Distribution of CRRITCC External Assists by Agency (2025)

Together, these data indicate that collaboration within the CRRITCC is not merely structural but operational. The center routinely supports partner agencies across jurisdictional lines and provides targeted assistance to external agencies when investigations intersect within the region. Qualitative interviews conducted as part of the process analysis further contextualize these patterns and document the center’s commitment to serving as a regional asset. Across agencies, interviewees described improved communication, more immediate access to shared information, and greater comfort requesting assistance across jurisdictional lines. Several participants noted that co-location and shared system access reduced delays and informal barriers that previously slowed investigations. These themes are examined in greater depth in the Process Analysis section, where interview findings provide additional insight into how the multi-agency structure shaped day-to-day collaboration.

4. Strategies Employed

The project implemented a coordinated set of strategies to improve real-time intelligence capabilities, strengthen cross-jurisdictional collaboration, and support time-sensitive investigations. These strategies were designed to address the fragmented information environment and investigative delays described earlier. The discussion below first describes the key strategies undertaken to address the identified crime problem and then highlights several innovations associated with the SPI project.

4.1 Key Strategies Undertaken to Address the Crime Problem

A central strategy of the project was the transition from a single-agency real time crime center to a formalized multi-agency operational model. The CRRTCC was designed to support partner agencies through real-time information sharing and analytic assistance during active incidents, as well as through investigative support for ongoing cases. The model emphasized enabling analysts from one agency to assist another by establishing shared access to core intelligence resources and developing collaborative workflows for requests and external assists across jurisdictions. In this way, the project moved collaboration beyond informal, case-by-case information sharing and toward a structured multi-agency analytical environment capable of supporting incidents throughout the Capital Region.

Supporting this operational model required the development of a dedicated analytical workforce capable of functioning in a real-time, multi-agency environment. At the time of this report, the center operates with ten full-time intelligence analysts, two part-time analysts, and three floor supervisors (one from each local partner agency). Participating agencies also worked to align hiring standards, qualifications, salary structures, schedules, and training expectations so that personnel from different agencies could operate under consistent professional standards.

Analysts were recruited from a range of professional backgrounds, including former law enforcement personnel, dispatchers, and recent college graduates with analytical training. This mix of experience was intended to create a workforce capable of both conducting technical analysis and communicating effectively with officers and investigators in the field.

Staffing the CRRTCC also required balancing operational coverage with challenges related to recruitment, training, and retention of qualified personnel. Agencies worked collaboratively to develop staffing levels that would provide adequate analytical coverage while maintaining flexibility to accommodate turnover and the ongoing need to train new analysts. These considerations remain an ongoing operational issue as the center continues to expand its analytical capabilities and refine its procedures.

Training and professional development were also important components of the staffing strategy. Prior to the launch of the regional center, the smaller single-agency RTCC operated by LCSO served as a two-year pilot environment and provided practical experience that informed the training of CRRTCC analysts. Building on this experience, the CRRTCC implemented a structured Analyst Training Program consisting of multiple phases and a shadowing component, which was informed by the San Jose Field Training Officer Program used by many law enforcement agencies to train their recruits. The program includes instruction on core databases, investigative technologies, policies, and operational procedures, followed by supervised on-the-job training before analysts work independently. The training program has undergone several iterations since implementation and continues to evolve as the center incorporates new technologies and operational practices.

In addition to establishing the multi-agency operational structure and analytical workforce, the project deployed investigative technologies intended to strengthen the

identification of vehicles and suspects associated with criminal incidents. Grant funds supported the deployment of ALPR technology in locations selected through a data-driven approach intended to improve investigative capabilities and support cross-jurisdictional information sharing. Deployment decisions were guided by crime analysis and intelligence assessments, including spatial analyses conducted in collaboration with the research team, identifying areas and transportation corridors where vehicle-related information could provide the greatest investigative value.

For deployments within the City of Tallahassee, TPD and the FSU research team conducted an analysis identifying high-crime areas concentrated around federally supported multi-family housing complexes. Deployment of ALPR units aligned with those findings. Using grant funds, TPD purchased 18 ALPR units and installed 16 units at three major housing complexes and two units on city property to cover an additional high-crime area. Installation occurred between May 10 and October 15, 2024, and the cameras remained operational during the grant period.

Deployment planning also considered broader regional transportation patterns that influence crime and investigative activity across Leon County. Several major transportation corridors, including Interstate 10 and multiple state highways connecting Tallahassee to surrounding regions, serve as primary routes for travel through North Florida and into neighboring states. Analysts identified these corridors as strategically important locations where vehicle-identification technologies could provide substantial investigative value.

Implementation of ALPR technology outside the city presented several logistical challenges, particularly in unincorporated areas of Leon County. Infrastructure limitations, right-of-way constraints, and permitting requirements through the Florida Department of

Transportation affected installation timelines and site selection for some potential deployment locations. Despite these challenges, the deployment strategy prioritized locations where ALPR technology could provide the strongest investigative value based on crime data, traffic patterns, and regional mobility considerations.

A key implementation strategy was ensuring cross-agency access to ALPR data so that investigative support would not be constrained by agency-specific systems. Participating agencies were provided access to ALPR data through a shared platform environment. This approach allows analysts from one agency to assist another agency's investigations using the same data resources, helping ensure that support can be provided more seamlessly during time-sensitive incidents. The deployment and shared-access model were intended to increase the likelihood that suspect vehicles could be identified quickly and that vehicle movement associated with criminal incidents could be tracked across jurisdictions.

Beyond the deployment of ALPR technology, the project also focused on integrating and standardizing access to a wide range of investigative tools and databases used by participating agencies. A major component of this effort involved implementing the Motorola CommandCentral Aware (CCA) platform to consolidate multiple data streams and support real-time situational awareness. CCA was selected early in the implementation process as a system capable of integrating computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data, radio communications, ALPR systems, and public safety camera feeds within a single operational interface used by CRRTPC analysts. The goal was to reduce the need for analysts and investigators to maintain unique login information and navigate multiple vendor-based systems independently and instead provide a more unified environment for synthesizing information during real-time incidents.

As part of implementation, the CRRTCC operations team conducted a comprehensive review of agency databases and existing data-sharing agreements. Following this review, participating agencies identified gaps in cross-agency access and either purchased additional system licenses or established new data-sharing arrangements to ensure analysts from all partner agencies could access critical investigative resources. Where feasible, agencies also worked to standardize vendors and technology platforms in order to facilitate data sharing and system interoperability. The operations team continues to review integrated technologies and data-sharing arrangements as new tools are introduced and operational needs evolve.

Together, these strategies expanded the capacity of CRRTCC analysts to provide real-time support during active incidents by monitoring calls for service, reviewing camera resources, querying ALPR data, and searching across multiple databases to identify vehicles, suspects, or other relevant investigative information. These strategies also align with evidence-based policing principles emphasized in the original proposal, including problem-oriented policing and the SARA model (Hinkle, Weisburd, Telep, & Petersen, 2020; Santos, 2014). Prior research on technologies commonly used in real-time crime centers, such as CCTV systems and automatic license plate readers, also informed the selection and deployment of investigative tools within the CRRTCC. Participating agencies have committed to sustaining the operational model and associated technology platforms beyond the grant period, allowing the CRRTCC to continue operating as a regional intelligence resource supporting multiple agencies throughout the Florida Capital Region.

In addition to implementing these core strategies, the project introduced several operational and organizational innovations within the SPI framework.

4.2 Innovations Employed Throughout SPI

One important innovation was the use of a multi-agency real-time crime center as the primary operational model. Many real time crime centers operate within a single law enforcement agency and provide analytical support primarily to that agency's personnel. In contrast, the CRRGCC was designed from the outset as a regional intelligence center serving multiple partner agencies. Analysts contributed by different agencies work side-by-side in a shared operational environment, follow common procedures, and provide cross-agency analytical support using shared access to investigative tools and databases. This structure promotes consistent analytical practices, facilitates information sharing, and allows intelligence resources to be applied where they are most needed across the Capital Region.

Another innovation involved the implementation of standardized cross-agency access to ALPR data. Rather than restricting access to agency-specific ALPR systems, the project established a shared platform environment through which participating agencies could access ALPR information. This approach reduces barriers to real-time intelligence sharing during vehicle-related investigations and other incidents in which vehicles are relevant. Analysts from any participating agency can query ALPR data and assist investigations regardless of where the incident occurred, supporting faster identification of suspect vehicles and related investigative leads.

The project also implemented a central integration strategy using Motorola CCA to consolidate multiple data streams and investigative resources within a single operational platform. Integrating CAD data, radio communications, ALPR systems, and camera feeds allows analysts to monitor active incidents and synthesize information more quickly than would be possible when navigating multiple systems independently. This integration strategy was intended

to create a unified operational environment capable of supporting real-time intelligence production across agencies.

Operational experience during implementation also required the CRRTCC to adapt to vendor and system limitations associated with multi-agency environments. Many technology products used in policing are designed primarily for single-agency use, which can create challenges when integrating systems across multiple jurisdictions. For example, early implementation revealed that some vendor platforms required redundant data entry across agencies' ALPR instances, and certain alert formats initially lacked sufficient detail for operational use. Addressing these limitations required practical adaptations, including adjustments to alert formats, modifications to data workflows, and the implementation of mobile notification systems to ensure that analysts and officers received actionable information in a timely manner. In some cases, CRRTCC staff worked directly with vendors to modify system functionality in order to better support multi-agency operational needs.

The operational workflow developed within the CRRTCC also reflects an innovative approach to real-time intelligence support. Rather than limiting analysis to post-incident review, analysts monitor calls for service and other operational information streams and provide investigative leads, suspect identification, and situational awareness during active incidents. This model allows intelligence products to be generated and delivered in real time, enabling officers and investigators to incorporate analytical information into operational decision-making.

Finally, the CRRTCC model incorporates an embedded research partnership as part of its governance structure. Researchers from FSU's College of Criminology and Criminal Justice were included as a founding and voting partner in the CRRTCC governance framework. This arrangement allows researchers to participate in discussions related to planning, implementation,

and operational decision-making while also conducting independent evaluation activities. Embedding the research partnership within the governance structure helps ensure its long-term institutionalization and that research questions remain closely aligned with operational realities and allows findings from the evaluation to inform ongoing policy and operational decisions within the center.

Together, these strategies created the foundation for a multi-agency real-time intelligence model supporting active incidents and investigations across the Capital Region. The combination of shared analytical staffing, integrated technology platforms, and cross-agency access to investigative resources enables analysts to support active incidents and investigations across jurisdictions. The following section describes how these capabilities are used operationally, including patterns of analytical activity and the types of intelligence support provided through the CRRTCC.

5. Data and Intelligence

A central goal of this SPI project was to strengthen the use of data and intelligence to support proactive policing and more effective investigations. Consistent with these goals, the CRRTCC was developed to enhance data-driven and evidence-based policing by integrating operational data sources, producing real-time intelligence, and delivering that information directly to officers, deputies, and investigators. Through the CRRTCC, participating agencies expanded their ability to combine information from multiple systems, analyze that information quickly, and translate it into actionable intelligence. Over time, these capabilities became increasingly integrated into routine policing activities across the partner agencies.

5.1 Development and Integration of Data Resources

The CRRTCC functions as a centralized environment for bringing together information from multiple operational data sources. Analysts regularly access and combine information from CAD systems, records management systems (RMS), ALPR and other camera systems, and other investigative databases. These systems provide information on vehicle movements, incident reports, suspect descriptions, and locations relevant to active incidents and ongoing investigations. By making these sources available within a common operational setting, the CRRTCC reduces the time required to locate, query, and synthesize relevant information.

Motorola CCA serves as a key platform within this integrated environment, providing a unified interface through which analysts can search and analyze multiple data sources. The platform allows analysts to identify vehicles captured by ALPR cameras, review historical records associated with individuals or locations, and identify information that may link incidents across time or jurisdictional boundaries. Access to these integrated resources allows analysts to assemble information more quickly than would be possible if officers or investigators had to consult multiple systems separately.

As the CRRTCC developed, participating agencies also worked to expand and standardize access to relevant data sources. This process involved coordinating data-sharing agreements, establishing appropriate access permissions across agencies, and integrating additional technologies as they became available. Although some differences in agency policies and access levels remain, the CRRTCC has substantially improved the speed and consistency of information sharing among participating agencies.

5.2 Operational Intelligence Production

Within this integrated data environment, CRRTCC analysts play a central role in transforming raw information into operational intelligence. Analysts monitor calls for service and other operational channels to identify incidents for which additional information may assist responding officers or investigators. When an incident occurs, analysts can consult multiple systems to identify relevant information, such as vehicles associated with the location, individuals linked to prior incidents, or camera footage that may capture suspect activity.

Analysts then synthesize this information and communicate relevant findings to officers, deputies, and investigators. This support may include identifying possible suspect vehicles, clarifying whether a person or location has recent law enforcement contacts, or providing additional situational awareness before officer arrival. By organizing and relaying this information in real time, analysts help personnel respond more efficiently and make better-informed decisions during active incidents.

In addition to supporting active calls for service, analysts also contribute to follow-up investigative work. By retrieving relevant information from available systems and identifying connections across incidents, suspects, vehicles, and locations, analysts can help generate investigative leads that might otherwise take substantially longer to develop. In this way, CRRTCC analysts contribute both to immediate operational response and to longer-term investigative efforts.

5.3 Use of Intelligence by Officers and Deputies

The availability of real-time intelligence through the CRRTCC has gradually changed how officers, deputies, and investigators incorporate information into their daily work. Responding personnel may now receive additional information about a call before arriving on

scene, such as vehicles captured by nearby cameras or background information about individuals associated with the location. This information can improve situational awareness and help personnel approach incidents with a clearer understanding of potential risks and relevant context.

Investigators also use CRRTCC support to move more quickly from an initial incident to follow-up action. Analysts can review camera footage, search ALPR data for vehicles of interest, and identify possible connections across cases. By providing this support, the CRRTCC helps investigators develop leads more quickly and direct attention to the most relevant people, vehicles, or locations.

As agencies became more familiar with the CRRTCC's capabilities, analyst support increasingly became a routine part of operations. Officers and deputies gradually learned when and how the center could assist with calls for service, and analysts began participating in briefings and check-ins with operational units to explain available resources and demonstrate how the center could support field operations. Agencies also incorporated information about the CRRTCC into field training and recruit orientation so that new personnel would be familiar with its capabilities from the outset. Over time, these practices helped build broader awareness and acceptance of the CRRTCC across participating agencies and further integrate intelligence support into day-to-day policing activities.

5.4 Regional Intelligence Sharing, Operational Learning, and Research

An important broader impact of the project has been the development of the CRRTCC as a regional intelligence resource serving multiple agencies. This reflects a central goal of the SPI program: improving law enforcement effectiveness through more coordinated, data-informed, and problem-oriented responses to crime. Rather than limiting analytical support to a single department, the center allows participating agencies to draw on shared personnel, technologies,

and information systems in a common operational environment. This structure strengthens coordination and allows intelligence resources to be applied more flexibly throughout the Capital Region.

The multi-agency model is also valuable beyond the core partner agencies. Because the CRRTCC can provide analytical support to smaller agencies in the broader region that may have more limited in-house capacity, it extends the benefits of real-time intelligence beyond the jurisdictions directly staffing the center. This allows the CRRTCC to function not only as a shared resource for its primary partners, but also as a broader regional asset when outside agencies need support with active incidents or investigations.

The project also generated practical lessons about implementation in a multi-agency setting. As agencies worked to integrate systems, align workflows, and address access limitations, they identified a range of operational issues that may have been less visible under a single-agency model. These experiences helped refine procedures, clarify technology needs, and strengthen the overall functioning of the center.

Finally, the project benefited from the embedded research partnership that supported ongoing assessment and refinement of CRRTCC operations. This arrangement allowed the research team to participate in planning, implementation, and operational decision-making while also documenting how the center developed over time. In addition to supporting the formal evaluation, the partnership provided agencies with a structured process for reflecting on implementation challenges, identifying opportunities for improvement, and strengthening the evidence base for future decision-making.

6. Analysis and Evaluation

To assess the implementation of the CRRTCC initiative and examine associated operational and crime-related outcomes, an evaluation was conducted through a collaborative partnership between the participating agencies and FSU CCCJ researchers. This partnership allowed the evaluation to draw on both the operational knowledge of practitioners and the analytic expertise of the research team. Throughout the project, researchers worked closely with CRRTCC personnel and partner agencies to document implementation activities, analyze operational data, and assess potential changes in crime-related outcomes and other indicators associated with the initiative.

Because the CRRTCC represents a complex operational initiative rather than a single discrete intervention, the evaluation relies on multiple complementary methods to examine different dimensions of implementation and potential impact. The evaluation incorporates analyses of RTCC operational activity, a community survey assessing public awareness and perceptions of law enforcement technologies, quasi-experimental analyses of selected outcomes following implementation of the RTCC and grant-funded camera deployments, and qualitative interviews with analysts, supervisors, and partner agency representatives. Together, these components are intended to provide a practical understanding of how the CRRTCC functions and how it supports participating agencies and other law enforcement partners across the region. The sections that follow present the results of these complementary components of the evaluation.

6.1 Community Awareness and Perceptions of Law Enforcement Technologies

The evaluation included a community survey to provide insight into public awareness of and attitudes toward several technologies used by local law enforcement agencies, including

technologies central to CRRTPC operations. This component of the evaluation is important because public perceptions of law enforcement technology can shape the broader environment in which those tools are implemented, used, and sustained. It is also especially valuable because there remains relatively limited empirical evidence on public perceptions of real time crime centers themselves, even as broader research on police technologies continues to expand (Gramaglia & Phillips, 2018). Understanding community awareness and support therefore provides useful context for interpreting the broader role of technology in the Capital Region.

The survey was administered to residents of the Tallahassee–Leon County area to assess community awareness of law enforcement technologies and attitudes toward their use. Using an address-based sampling approach, 15,000 residential addresses were randomly selected and mailed invitations directing residents to complete the survey primarily online. A paper version of the questionnaire was also made available for residents who preferred a printed survey or did not have reliable internet access. In total, 1,915 surveys were completed, yielding a response rate of approximately 13 percent. The survey asked residents about their familiarity with and support for several technologies used by local law enforcement agencies participating in the CRRTPC, including automatic license plate readers (ALPR), closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), body-worn cameras (BWC), gunshot detection technology (GDT), facial recognition systems (FRS), social media surveillance (SMS), and the CRRTPC itself. Together, these questions provide insight into the degree to which residents are aware of the technologies that support CRRTPC operations and how those technologies are perceived by members of the community. Additional details about the survey design and sampling procedures are provided in the separate community survey report prepared as part of this project.

Figure 6.1.1 presents the percentage of residents who were unsure or incorrect about the use of several technologies employed by local law enforcement agencies participating in the CRRTCC. The results indicate that levels of familiarity vary considerably across technologies. Residents appear to be most familiar with technologies that are more visible in day-to-day policing, such as body-worn cameras and security cameras, where relatively few respondents reported uncertainty about their use. In contrast, substantially larger shares of residents reported being unsure or incorrect about the purpose of technologies that operate more behind the scenes, including gunshot detection systems, license plate reader networks, and the CRRTCC. In fact, fewer than 25 percent of respondents reported that they had previously heard of the CRRTCC, indicating that the center remains unfamiliar to many members of the community. These patterns are not unexpected, as some technologies are highly visible in routine policing activities while others primarily support analytical or investigative functions that are less visible to the public.




Figure 6.1.1. Percent of Residents Unsure or Incorrect About the Use of Technologies

Figure 6.1.2 presents residents' agreement that these technologies are useful for reducing crime. Across all technologies included in the survey, a majority of respondents agreed that they

are useful for this purpose. Technologies commonly associated with accountability or officer safety, such as body-worn cameras, received particularly strong agreement, with roughly two-thirds of respondents indicating that they are useful for reducing crime. Other tools that support investigations or situational awareness, including license plate readers, security camera systems, and gunshot detection technology, also were viewed as useful by a substantial portion of respondents.




Figure 6.1.2. Residents' Agreement That Technologies Are Useful for Reducing Crime

In addition to awareness and support, the survey also examined whether residents viewed these technologies as infringing on privacy. Figure 6.1.3 summarizes responses to this question. Overall, most respondents did not express strong privacy concerns about the technologies examined. Concerns were lowest for body-worn cameras, with only a small share of respondents indicating that they viewed these systems as infringing on privacy. Similarly, relatively few respondents expressed concern about gunshot detection technology or the CRRTCC. Higher levels of concern were observed for facial recognition systems and CCTV, where a larger proportion of respondents indicated that these technologies may infringe on privacy.




Figure 6.1.3. Residents’ Agreement That Technologies Infringe on Privacy

These findings suggest that while many law enforcement technologies are generally accepted by the public, privacy concerns are not uniform across tools. Technologies that involve more direct or continuous forms of surveillance appear more likely to raise concerns, indicating that continued attention to transparency and public communication may be important as these systems are used and expanded.

Taken together, the survey findings point to a consistent pattern. More visible technologies, such as body-worn cameras and CCTV, tend to be more familiar to residents, while technologies that operate more in the background—including the CRRTCC itself—are less widely recognized. At the same time, support for the use of these technologies is generally fairly strong, and privacy concerns appear to be concentrated more heavily around a narrower set of tools, especially facial recognition systems and, to a lesser extent, CCTV. This suggests that lower awareness does not necessarily correspond to lower support, but it also underscores that some technologies raise more concern than others.

These findings provide useful context for understanding the implementation of the CRRTCC and the broader use of technology-supported policing strategies. The results suggest that many residents are generally supportive of technologies that can assist with public safety and

investigations, even when familiarity with some specific tools remains limited. At the same time, variation in awareness and privacy concerns highlights the importance of continued transparency and public communication, particularly for technologies that are less visible to the public or more likely to raise surveillance-related concerns. By documenting these views, the survey adds an important community perspective to the broader evaluation of the CRRTCC and its associated technologies.

6.2 RTCC Operations and Activity Patterns

In addition to the assist data presented earlier, the evaluation examined administrative activity logs maintained by the CRRTCC. These logs capture a range of routine analyst tasks performed in support of active incidents and investigations, including reviews of license plate reader (LPR) alerts, queries involving persons or vehicles, reviews of “be on the lookout” (BOLO) information, and other forms of analytical support. Because these activities are recorded as they occur, the logs provide a useful picture of how the center functions on a day-to-day basis.

Figure 6.2.1 summarizes the distribution of analyst activities recorded during 2025. By far the largest category involved reviews of LPR hits, reflecting the central role of LPR systems in CRRTCC operations and the large volume of alerts generated by the regional camera network. Analysts also frequently conducted subject and vehicle queries and reviewed BOLO information. These activities are core components of real-time intelligence support because they help analysts identify vehicles, individuals, and prior incidents that may be relevant to ongoing calls for service or investigations. Analytical assistance also accounted for a substantial number of recorded activities, indicating that the center’s work extends beyond reviewing automated alerts and includes direct support to officers, deputies, and investigators.




Figure 6.2.1. CRRTCC Analyst Activities by Type (2025)

The remaining activity categories occurred at much lower frequencies, but they still help illustrate the range of functions performed within the center. These included social media queries, facial recognition searches and leads, BOLO bulletins issued, camera surveillance, and recoveries involving stolen vehicles or tags. Although these activities represent a much smaller share of total logged activity, they show that the CRRTCC supports operations through multiple tools and information streams rather than through any single system alone.

Taken together, the 2025 activity profile indicates that the CRRTCC’s work is driven primarily by routine monitoring, review, and querying functions that support active law enforcement operations. The CRRTCC appears to function as a continuous analytical support hub that helps agencies manage large volumes of incoming information and translate that information into usable operational intelligence.

Figure 6.2.2 places these activity levels in context by comparing selected core activities recorded by the CRRTCC in 2025 with those recorded by the earlier single-agency LCSO RTCC in 2022. The comparison focuses on several activities that were recorded consistently across both

settings: LPR hit reviews, subject queries, vehicle queries, and BOLO reviews. Across nearly all categories, the multi-agency CRRTCC recorded higher levels of activity than the earlier LCSO RTCC. The largest difference appears in LPR hit reviews, but higher levels are also evident for subject queries and BOLO reviews. Vehicle queries were much more similar across the two settings.




Figure 6.2.2. Comparison of Single-Agency and Multi-Agency RTCC Activity

These differences are consistent with the broader scope of the CRRTCC. Unlike the earlier LCSO RTCC, the CRRTCC supports multiple participating agencies, operates within a more formalized regional model, and draws on a larger set of shared technological resources. The activity increases shown here therefore appear to reflect more than simple year-to-year variation. They are more consistent with an expansion in the scale and routinization of analytical support following the transition from a single-agency center to a multi-agency regional center.

At the same time, the comparison should be interpreted as descriptive rather than causal. The earlier LCSO RTCC did provide support beyond its home agency in some circumstances, and the two periods differ in organizational structure, technology, and regional integration. Even with those caveats, the contrast remains useful because it shows that the multi-agency model is associated with substantially greater activity in several of the core functions most central to RTCC operations.

Overall, the findings in this section suggest that the CRRTCC has become a high-volume analytical support center whose routine work is concentrated in tasks closely linked to real-time intelligence functions, especially LPR review and cross-system querying. The comparison with the earlier LCSO RTCC further suggests that the shift to a formal multi-agency model was accompanied by a substantial expansion in the volume of this activity. This pattern suggests that the CRRTCC is not merely a symbolic organizational change. It appears to have increased the scale at which shared technologies and analyst capacity are being used to support law enforcement operations across the region.

6.3 Impact of the RTCC on Public and Officer Safety Outcomes

The preceding sections show that the CRRTCC became an active and routine source of analytical support across participating agencies. The next question is whether this operational activity was associated with measurable changes in selected public safety, operational, and officer safety outcomes. To examine that question, this section uses interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) to assess patterns in monthly outcomes before and after the CRRTCC began operations. The outcomes were selected to vary in how closely they align with the center's core functions, allowing for a more targeted assessment of where measurable effects would be most likely to emerge.

Analytic Approach and Measures

The analysis examines whether implementation of the CRRTCC was associated with changes in selected monthly outcomes over time. For each outcome, the models estimate three related features of change: the pre-implementation trend, any immediate shift in the level of the outcome following implementation, and any change in the post-implementation trend. This approach is well suited to organizational interventions such as RTCCs because effects may appear either as an abrupt change or as a more gradual shift as personnel incorporate new tools and workflows into routine operations.

The timing of implementation is important in this case because the CRRTCC did not become fully operational all at once. Instead, it entered a soft-opening phase in early 2023 and continued to develop over the months that followed, with the formal grand opening occurring later that year. Because the soft opening more closely reflects the point at which the CRRTCC first became operational and began to influence agency activity, it was treated as the primary intervention point in the analysis. This approach also helps account for the likelihood that any effects of the CRRTCC would emerge gradually rather than immediately.

The analysis uses monthly administrative data drawn from the records management systems of TPD and LCSO. These agencies account for the vast majority of activity associated with the CRRTCC. Comparable historical data were not available from FSUPD in a form suitable for consistent time-series analysis because of differences in data structure and a transition between records management system vendors during the evaluation period. Accordingly, the ITSA focuses on outcomes recorded by TPD and LCSO, with all measures aggregated to the monthly level.

Because the dependent variables are monthly count or rate outcomes, the models were estimated using Poisson regression with robust standard errors and a log link. Month-of-year fixed effects were included to account for recurring seasonal patterns in crime and policing activity unrelated to the CRRRTCC. Figures in this section display the monthly trends and fitted interrupted time series patterns for each outcome, while the full regression estimates are reported in Appendix Tables A1 through A4.

The outcomes examined in this section include motor vehicle thefts and recoveries, assaults on law enforcement officers, arrest outcomes, and several categories of reported crime. Arrest outcomes include total arrests, custodial arrests, and warrant arrests. Crime outcomes include National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Group A categories: Crimes Against Property, Crimes Against Society, and Crimes Against Persons. These outcomes vary in how closely they align with the operational functions of the CRRRTCC. Vehicle recoveries and warrant arrests are the most proximal to RTCC activity because they align closely with functions such as ALPR-based identification, camera review, database queries, and the rapid provision of actionable information to personnel in the field. Broader crime categories and officer assaults are more distal outcomes that may still be affected but are shaped more heavily by factors beyond the direct influence of the CRRRTCC. This distinction is important because stronger findings for more proximal outcomes would be more consistent with the mechanisms through which the center would be expected to affect agency activity.

Results

The results are presented beginning with outcomes most closely connected to the operational functions of the CRRRTCC, followed by arrest and officer safety outcomes, and then broader crime categories. This ordering reflects the logic of the evaluation. If the CRRRTCC is

influencing outcomes consistent with its intended functions, the clearest changes should appear in outcomes most closely tied to real-time analytical support.

Vehicle-Centered Outcomes

Vehicle recoveries show one of the clearest and most policy-relevant patterns in the analysis. Figure 6.3.1 displays the monthly trend in vehicle recoveries before and after the CRRTCC began operating, and the corresponding model estimates are reported in Appendix Table A1. Prior to implementation, the recovery rate was trending downward, indicating that a smaller share of stolen vehicles was being recovered over time. After the CRRTCC became operational, that pattern shifted. The models indicate both a modest immediate increase and, more importantly, a statistically significant improvement in the trajectory of the series. In practical terms, the earlier decline in vehicle recoveries stopped after the launch of the center, and recoveries improved relative to the pattern that had been in place beforehand.




Figure 6.3.1. Interrupted Time Series Results for Vehicle Recoveries

Vehicle recovery aligns closely with core CRRTCC functions, including identifying vehicles through ALPR data, reviewing camera footage, linking vehicle information across agencies, and rapidly relaying actionable information to personnel in the field. Because vehicle recoveries are so closely tied to core CRRTCC functions, this finding is especially informative in assessing whether the overall pattern of results is consistent with how the center would be expected to affect agency activity. It is also notable that the pattern is sustained rather than limited to a brief fluctuation immediately after implementation, suggesting a more durable shift in operational performance.

Motor vehicle theft shows another supportive pattern. Figure 6.3.2 and Appendix Table A1 present the results for this outcome. Prior to implementation, motor vehicle theft was increasing. After the CRRTCC became operational, that trajectory shifted in the opposite direction, producing a statistically significant decline relative to the earlier trend. This is an important finding because the result is not merely a flattening of the series. Rather, the post-implementation trend reverses the earlier upward trajectory.




Figure 6.3.2. Interrupted Time Series Results for Motor Vehicle Theft

Although the CRRTCC does not directly prevent theft events from occurring, motor vehicle theft is one of the offense types most plausibly connected to the center’s operational capabilities. Vehicle-focused analytical support, especially through ALPR systems, camera networks, and cross-agency information sharing, may increase the likelihood that stolen vehicles are identified quickly, linked across incidents, and recovered before they circulate more widely or are used in additional offenses. In that sense, the motor vehicle theft finding is consistent with the possibility that the CRRTCC is affecting one of the offense categories most closely tied to its vehicle-centered functions.

Arrest and Officer Safety Outcomes

Arrest outcomes present a mixed pattern, and that pattern is important for interpreting the overall results. Figure 6.3.3 displays the monthly pattern in warrant arrests before and after the CRRTCC began operating, and the corresponding model estimates are reported in Appendix Table A2. Prior to implementation, warrant arrests were declining. After the CRRTCC became

operational, that decline gave way to a significant upward shift, and the post-implementation trend was positive. This change is notable because warrant arrests are one of the outcomes most closely tied to the kinds of real-time analytical support the CRRTCC is designed to provide.




Figure 6.3.3. Interrupted Time Series Results for Warrant Arrests

Custodial arrests, by contrast, did not show a similarly favorable pattern after implementation. As shown in Figure 6.3.4 and Appendix Table A2, the pre-implementation trend was slightly upward, but that trend weakened or turned downward after implementation. These changes were weaker and less consistent than those observed for warrant arrests. This contrast with warrant arrests is useful because custodial arrests reflect a much broader set of enforcement activities, many of which are influenced by factors outside the CRRTCC’s direct role. The absence of a similarly favorable pattern here makes the warrant arrest finding easier to interpret as more targeted rather than as part of a broad increase in arrest activity.




Figure 6.3.4. Interrupted Time Series Results for Custodial Arrests

Figure 6.3.5 and Appendix Table A3 present the results for assaults on law enforcement officers. This outcome was included because one of the commonly cited potential benefits of real-time analytical support is improved situational awareness during active incidents. In principle, faster access to information about suspects, vehicles, prior incidents, and scene conditions could help personnel approach some situations more safely. At the same time, assaults on officers are a relatively rare and highly variable monthly outcome, and many such incidents arise in dynamic encounters where even strong real-time intelligence may have limited opportunity to alter the initial confrontation.




Figure 6.3.5. Interrupted Time Series Results for Assaults on Officers

The soft-opening model indicates a statistically significant immediate decline in assaults on officers around implementation. However, there is little evidence that this decline was followed by a sustained favorable change in trajectory. The post-implementation slope was positive, and the change in slope was not statistically significant. Taken together, these findings suggest a short-term drop around implementation rather than a durable reduction over time.

Broader Crime Outcomes

Figures 6.3.6 through 6.3.8 and Appendix Table A4 present the results for the broader NIBRS Group A categories: Crimes Against Property, Crimes Against Society, and Crimes Against Persons. Crimes Against Property show a supportive pattern. Prior to implementation, this category was trending upward. After the CRRTCC began operating, that upward trajectory slowed significantly, and the post-implementation trend leveled off. In other words, property crime did not show a statistically significant immediate drop around implementation, but the earlier increase leveled off rather than continuing. That is a more moderate pattern than the one

observed for the more proximal outcomes, but it is still broadly consistent with the possibility that the CRRTPCC contributed to improved coordination or response in ways that affected some property offenses.




Figure 6.3.6. Interrupted Time Series Results for Crimes Against Property

Crimes Against Society show an even clearer shift. Prior to implementation, this category was increasing, but the soft-opening model indicates both a statistically significant immediate decline and a statistically significant downward change in slope after implementation. The post-implementation slope was slightly negative and only marginally significant, suggesting that the main pattern is an immediate drop followed by a much flatter trajectory than before. Because society offenses often include drug and weapons violations that may be more responsive to proactive and information-driven enforcement, this result is plausible in light of the operational role of the CRRTPCC.




Figure 6.3.7. Interrupted Time Series Results for Crimes Against Society

Crimes Against Persons, by contrast, show little evidence of change after implementation. The soft-opening model does not indicate a statistically significant immediate shift, a statistically significant change in slope, or a statistically significant post-implementation trend. In practical terms, this category appears relatively stable across the intervention point once seasonal patterns are taken into account. That is substantively understandable. Many offenses in this category arise from interpersonal conflicts, domestic incidents, or other highly situational events that may be less responsive to real-time analytical support.




Figure 6.3.8. Interrupted Time Series Results for Crimes Against Persons

Overall, the broader crime results are mixed, but they are not random. Property and society offenses show more favorable post-implementation patterns, whereas crimes against persons do not. That more selective pattern is easier to interpret than a uniform change across all offense categories because it aligns more closely with the types of outcomes the CRRTPC would be expected to influence, whether directly or indirectly.

Summary of Findings

Taken together, the interrupted time series results are most supportive for vehicle recoveries, motor vehicle theft, and warrant arrests. These outcomes show clearer favorable changes after implementation than do the other measures examined here. Broader crime categories present a more mixed picture, with Crimes Against Property and Crimes Against Society showing some evidence of improvement, while Crimes Against Persons show relatively little change. Assaults on law enforcement officers show evidence of a short-term decline around implementation, but not a sustained favorable shift over time. Overall, the results suggest that the

CRRTCC was more closely associated with outcomes tied to vehicle-focused and information-driven real-time support than with broader or more distal outcomes.

Limitations and Future Research

These findings should be interpreted in light of several limitations. As with any observational interrupted time series design, the analysis cannot fully rule out the possibility that other contemporaneous changes influenced the observed outcomes. Broader shifts in crime patterns, policing practices, or local conditions during the study period may have contributed to some of the trends identified here.

It is also important to recognize that the CRRTCC did not reach full operational capacity immediately. Staffing levels, analyst workflows, and cross-agency coordination developed gradually during the early months of operation as agencies integrated personnel and refined procedures. As a result, the early post-implementation period likely reflects a transitional phase rather than the center's fully developed operating model. In addition, the outcomes examined here capture only part of the potential value of a real time crime center. Aggregate administrative measures can identify changes in arrests, crime trends, and related operational indicators, but they do not directly capture many of the day-to-day analytical contributions that CRRTCC personnel provide during active incidents and short-term follow-up.

Future research could build on these findings in several ways. As additional years of data become available, longer post-implementation observation windows will make it possible to assess whether the patterns identified here persist or change over time. Continued improvements in data systems may also allow more direct measurement of CRRTCC involvement in specific incidents, enabling comparisons between cases in which analysts were actively engaged and those in which they were not. Qualitative findings presented in a subsequent section of the report

also help clarify some of these mechanisms and provide additional context for interpreting the patterns observed here.

6.4 Impact of Grant-Funded Camera Deployments

This section examines the effects of the grant-funded camera deployments on vehicle-related outcomes. Unlike the broader interrupted time series analysis, which evaluates the CRRTCC as a system-level intervention, this analysis focuses on the localized impact of camera installations. Because cameras were deployed at different times across locations, the analysis assesses how outcomes changed in areas before and after installation, with particular attention to motor vehicle theft and vehicle recovery. Prior research suggests that camera and license plate reader technologies may be especially relevant to vehicle-related outcomes, making these a useful focus for evaluating the grant-funded deployments (Piza et al., 2019; Lum et al., 2011).

Analytic Approach and Measures

This analysis uses longitudinal data from January 2022 through October 2025 to examine whether grant-funded camera deployments were associated with changes in motor vehicle theft and vehicle recovery. Crime data from TPD and LCSO were geocoded and aggregated to the census block group level on a monthly basis. The first outcome measure is the number of motor vehicle thefts in each block group during each month. The second is the vehicle recovery rate, defined as the proportion of stolen vehicles that were successfully recovered within each block-group and month.

Because grant cameras were installed at different times across locations, the analysis does not treat deployment as a single intervention occurring at one point in time. Instead, each block group is aligned to its own camera activation date so that changes in outcomes can be examined relative to the timing of the installation. This approach is intended to account for the staggered

rollout of the grant-funded cameras and to assess whether outcomes changed in the periods before and after deployment within treated areas.

To improve stability and reduce sensitivity to short-term fluctuations, the monthly data were grouped into quarterly event-time intervals. The analysis examines four quarters prior to installation and six quarters following installation. Neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics drawn from the 2022 American Community Survey, including measures of neighborhood disadvantage and housing conditions, were included as controls, along with measures of baseline operational activity and existing camera coverage.

Motor vehicle theft counts were estimated using negative binomial regression, and vehicle recovery rates were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. The models also include month-of-year fixed effects to account for seasonal variation and clustered standard errors at the block group level to account for repeated observations over time. Figures in this section present the quarterly event-study estimates, and full model results are reported in Appendix Table A5.

Results

Impacts on Vehicle Theft

Figure 6.4.1 presents the quarterly event study estimates for motor vehicle theft before and after the installation of grant-funded cameras, with the solid vertical line marking the installation period. The pre-installation coefficients are positive and statistically significant in the earlier periods, indicating that cameras were placed in areas with relatively higher levels of vehicle theft prior to deployment. This pattern is consistent with a targeted implementation strategy focused on locations with elevated need.



Figure 6.4.1. Quarterly Event Study Results: Total Number of Stolen Vehicles

Immediately following installation (Months 0–2), the estimates suggest a short-term increase in recorded theft. This may reflect improved detection or reporting rather than a true increase in underlying incidents, as camera systems may make it easier to identify and document theft events. In the periods that follow, the pattern becomes more stable. The coefficients fluctuate around zero in the first several quarters after installation, with no clear evidence of an immediate sustained change. However, later periods show evidence of a decline in theft relative to the pre-installation pattern. By approximately one year after installation, the estimates suggest a more favorable trajectory, although the magnitude and consistency of this pattern vary across periods.

Overall, the results do not indicate a clear immediate reduction in vehicle theft following camera deployment. Instead, they are more consistent with a delayed effect, in which any potential impact emerges gradually over time. This pattern aligns with the possibility that camera-based interventions require time to be incorporated into investigative workflows and to influence behavior.

Impact on Vehicle Recovery Rate

Figure 6.4.2 presents the quarterly event study estimates for vehicle recovery following the installation of grant-funded cameras. Unlike the theft results, the pre-installation coefficients for recovery are generally small and not statistically significant, suggesting no clear pre-deployment pattern in recovery rates across the treated areas.




Figure 6.4.2. Quarterly Event Study Results: Vehicle Recovery Rate

In the first several quarters after installation, the estimates remain relatively flat, with little evidence of an immediate improvement in recovery. This suggests that camera deployment did not produce an abrupt increase in recovery rates in the short term. Over time, however, the pattern becomes more favorable. By the later post-installation period, the estimates turn positive, and the coefficient at roughly 15 months after installation is statistically significant. This pattern is consistent with the possibility that camera deployments contributed to improved vehicle recovery, but that the effect emerged gradually rather than immediately.

Overall, the recovery results suggest a delayed benefit of camera deployment. One plausible interpretation is that the cameras became more useful as they were incorporated more

fully into routine investigative and analytical workflows. This pattern is broadly consistent with the vehicle theft results, which also suggest that any effects of the camera deployments developed over time rather than appearing immediately after installation.

To assess the robustness of the results, we estimated additional models incorporating controls for seasonality, Tallahassee-specific academic cycles, and spatial correlation across nearby areas. These alternative specifications produced substantively similar results and did not materially change the overall patterns observed for either vehicle theft or vehicle recovery.

Summary of Findings

Taken together, the results suggest that the effects of camera deployment were not immediate but developed over time. The patterns are broadly consistent with a combination of improved detection in the short term and potential deterrence and investigative gains in the longer term. The delayed improvement in both theft and recovery outcomes also indicates that the effectiveness of camera-based interventions may depend on how fully they are integrated into existing workflows and analytical processes. These findings align with the broader results in this report, which show stronger evidence of impact for outcomes most closely tied to vehicle identification and real-time analytical support.

These findings should be interpreted in light of several limitations. Camera deployments were not randomly assigned but instead were generally targeted to areas with elevated levels of vehicle theft, which complicates causal interpretation and may contribute to the pre-installation patterns observed in the event study. In addition, the post-installation observation window is relatively short for some locations because cameras were installed at different times, limiting the ability to assess longer-term effects. The analysis also focuses on block group-level outcomes, which may not fully capture more localized changes or broader spatial dynamics. Finally, as with

other observational designs, the results cannot fully rule out the influence of other contemporaneous changes in crime patterns or policing practices during the study period.

6.5 Qualitative Interviews with CRRTCC Personnel and Stakeholders

In addition to the quantitative analyses presented earlier in this section, the evaluation included a qualitative assessment of stakeholder perspectives regarding the implementation and operation of the CRRTCC. While administrative data and statistical models can provide insight into operational patterns and potential changes in crime and operational outcomes, they cannot fully capture how the center was implemented, how it functions in practice, or how it is perceived by the personnel who use and manage it. Interviews with key stakeholders therefore provide important context for understanding the development of the CRRTCC, the challenges encountered during implementation, and the ways the center has been integrated into the operations of participating agencies.

The qualitative assessment focused on the experiences and perspectives of individuals directly involved in the implementation and day-to-day operation of the CRRTCC, including agency leadership, middle management, analysts, and patrol personnel. These interviews were designed to document the factors that facilitated and impeded the development of the multi-agency center, the operational challenges encountered during its early stages, and the perceived benefits of the CRRTCC for participating agencies and the broader region. The findings presented below highlight common themes that emerged across interviews and provide additional insight into how the CRRTCC has evolved since its launch.

Qualitative Interview Methodology

Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted with 27 CRRTCC stakeholders from February-May 2025. The purposes of the interviews were to (1) assess perceptions of the

CRRTCC's strengths, weaknesses, and value relative to other crime control efforts, (2) identify factors that facilitated and impeded the development, uptake, and buy-in of the CRRTCC and (3) explore factors that may facilitate or impede current and future operations. All four partner law enforcement agencies and the Florida State University College of Criminology and Criminal Justice were represented in the interviews by members of their executive staff¹ (n = 8), middle management² (n = 8), real time crime center analysts³ (n = 7), and patrol officers and deputies⁴ (n = 4). All executive staff and middle managers involved in the implementation and/or current operation of the CRRTCC were interviewed, while a random sample of real time crime center analysts, patrol officers, and deputies was selected for interviews.⁵

All interviews were conducted in-person and were approximately 35 minutes long. Each interview was attended by two or three members of the research team. One researcher conducted the interview while the other(s) took handwritten notes and monitored the recording device. After each interview, the audio recordings were transcribed in preparation for coding. The coding procedures involved line-by-line open coding completed by two members of the research team. The coded transcripts were then reviewed by two other researchers to identify any discrepancies. Consistent with prior qualitative research, meetings were then held with all four coders and consensus was reached for each code discrepancy.

¹ Executive staff positions: assistant sheriff, chief, dean, deputy chief, sheriff, special agent in charge

² Middle management positions: bureau chief, executive director, lieutenant, IT manager

³ Real time crime center analyst positions: analyst, analyst supervisor

⁴ Patrol officer and deputy positions: officer, deputy, sergeant

⁵ To ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of the interview subjects, names and specific ranks/titles are not provided. Rather, respondents from each of the four personnel categories—executive staff, middle management, analysts, and patrol officers and deputies—were randomized and numbered.

Findings

Implementation Challenges

Challenges associated with the implementation of the CRRTCC were discussed frequently throughout the interviews. Specifically, implementation challenges were raised 125 times by executive staff, 116 times by middle managers, and 42 times by real time crime center analysts. Challenges associated with determining the center's location, leadership structure, governance, and staffing were among the most commonly mentioned issues.

One of the first issues stakeholders had to address was how the implementation process itself would be organized. Prior to formally beginning the practical design and development of the CRRTCC, partners needed to determine how best to meet, communicate, and make decisions together. During interviews, nearly all executive staff and middle managers recalled the first preliminary meetings intended to discuss the interest, feasibility, and logistics of developing a multi-agency real time crime center. The meetings were held during the Covid-19 pandemic, all were online, and each was attended by over 50 people. It was challenging for any meaningful decisions to be made because, as Middle Manager #1 said, "...when you had that many people on a Zoom call, that was difficult because you're either sitting there for thirty minutes and they're talking about things that [you] didn't need to be there for, you were waiting to say something, [or someone was] interjecting."

After the first few meetings that followed this large group format proved to be unproductive, it was decided that smaller committees of people, based on their positions and expertise, were needed. To illustrate, Executive Staff #3 said, "If there's too many people in the room, nothing ever gets decided or accomplished. [So, we said] let's break down or focus the groups on the areas that [are needed] ...and let the upper leadership...be guided by the people

underneath them who are the experts.” With the establishment of the smaller working groups, identified problems and associated recommendations were then passed up the respective chains-of-command at each agency for discussion and decisions.

Location

One of the first implementation challenges was determining the physical location of the CRRTCC. None of the law enforcement partners had space at their respective agency buildings for a new real time crime center. After discussions with FSU administration, an unused building just off the university’s main campus was identified for the CRRTCC. Aside from the space being large enough, and immediately available, another cited benefit was that it was not physically located at any one agency. Executive staff and middle managers shared many similar sentiments about the importance of the CRRTCC being at a neutral location. For example, Executive Staff #3 said, “That’s a better way to do it... because you don’t have this one agency that can put a stake in the ground and say, this is mine.”

Governance and Leadership Structure

Other early challenges were how the new multi-agency center would be governed and led. Although there was some underlying skepticism about whether a shared governance structure would work, all executive staff members indicated that it was crucial for the CRRTCC to be governed by all partner agencies. Two governing bodies—the executive council and management group—were established and have representation from executive and middle managers from all partners. Who would lead the day-to-day operations of the center also had to be determined. Of concern was ensuring that one agency did not have more control than the others. For example, Executive staff #2 said, “If you allow one person to stay in one position too long, they build that kingdom. And then it becomes more of a silo than a regional asset.”

Ultimately, executive staff decided that the director of the LCSO RTCC would serve as the CRRTCC's first director along with a co-director from TPD; roles that would be voted on annually by the executive council.

Staffing and Resources

Hiring and retaining qualified analysts and supervisors for the CRRTCC was difficult. While LCSO had a small RTCC in operation at the time, the other agencies did not, which required that they created new positions and hired analysts. Executive Staff #2 said "staffing [was and] will always be our biggest challenge." In addition to hiring, standardizing salaries, schedules, and training were also raised as significant implementation challenges. The agencies operated on different shift schedules, which led to situations when there were not enough staff working in the center. For example, the FSUPD analysts were unable to work on the weekend or overnight because of the way their positions were classified. This left two agencies covering staffing for these times, creating some tension amongst the analysts. Ensuring the legacy LCSO and newly hired CRRTCC analysts were similarly trained was another commonly discussed challenge. For example, Analyst #2 said, "The growing pains of training and getting everyone up to a level where we're all operating smoothly together, that's been the biggest challenge..."

Funding also had to be secured early in the implementation phase. Executive Staff #5 said, "One sticking point was funding... who pays for what? Because when the initial numbers came back...wow, this is kind of expensive." Costs associated with construction, furniture, hard and software, technology integration, and salaries for new hires were identified as critical needs.

A primary factor contributing to the technology-related costs during implementation was that the partner agencies used different vendors and versions for many of their assets, which meant that each had independent contracts that regulated use and login access. Middle Manager

#7 said this was a significant challenge at the outset, and one that somewhat remains today, because each agency is a “separate entity,” and there are “four IT departments that [the center has] to deal with,” which created significant access issues for analysts. For example, Analyst #3 said, “The most challenging was the data sharing between [agencies], I [could] only access a report [from my agency]. That's a big issue.”

A lack of formal data sharing agreements between the agencies that dictated information sharing within the context of the CRRTCC was also a concern. Granting access across multiple agencies required modifying and creating new policies, oftentimes on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, Middle Manager #2 said, “You have to look at everything through three completely different lenses and then figure out the commonalities. And then figure out what's missing. And then see if the agencies will agree to adjust the policies.” Executive staff also had to determine how much information to share and how much access to give. For example, Executive Staff #5 said there were some initial concerns about sharing information, noting, “If we give you access, who's seeing it? What are you doing with it? Can we trust you with it?”

Implementation Successes

Implementation successes were discussed 134 times by executive staff, 134 times by middle managers, 8 times by real time crime center analysts, and 4 times by patrol officers and deputies. The factors cited most often were communication and longstanding relationships between many personnel.

Communication

Executive staff and middle management emphasized the importance of communication as a significant reason the CRRTCC was implemented successfully. While each noted various challenges that had to be overcome, they all indicated that frequent and regular communication

proved successful in navigating and addressing the challenges. Executive Staff #2 said “...When issues came up, we talked about them. We dealt with them.”

Longstanding Relationships

Likely contributing to the general ease with which leadership communicated were their longstanding professional and personal relationships. Many had attended the law enforcement academy together, participated in specialized trainings, and worked on cases alongside each other for years. These existing relationships helped leadership successfully navigate the many obstacles they faced during implementation. For example, Middle Manager #7 said, “...even though we have...agreements, you do have three separate agencies...So luckily, because of our tight group, we've been able to avoid a lot of hurdles and work through some of those.” Middle Manager #1 summarized the importance of the pre-existing relationships by saying, “Those relationships were key. The recipe was there... and everybody had the commitment to work it out together.”

Multi-Agency Decision

The decision to establish a multi-agency RTCC was mentioned 38 times by executive staff, 33 times by middle managers, 8 times by analysts, and once by patrol personnel. Several years prior to LCSO opening their own RTCC, a joint center was proposed to the other agencies. However, relationships between leadership were not strong, there was limited trust between the agencies, and some territorial claims prevented moving forward with a multi-agency center. In 2020, the idea to collaborate on a joint center was brought up again, and this time, there was agreement. Recognition that a lack of information sharing was hindering local efforts to confront crime was a major push to establish the multi-agency CRRTCC. As stated by Middle Manager #4, “...crime has no boundaries. So, the more information that you can share amongst the

agencies in this community, the better. And, three heads are better than one. And it's a force multiplier when you can get manpower from every agency and put it in one spot.”

Integration into Agency Operations and Buy-In

Because the CRRTCC would function independently, its integration into the operations of each agency was crucial. Integration was discussed 17 times by executive staff, 42 times by middle managers, 60 times by real time crime center analysts, and 12 times by patrol officers and deputies. Executive Staff #6 said, “I think it's integrated very well [now]. It took some time for the guys on the road to understand what they were doing.” While LCSO’s RTCC assisted other agencies, the functions and benefits were not well understood by those outside of LCSO. Thus, there were differences across agencies in the use of the CRRTCC. Middle Manager #1 said, “I saw officers that could have used the RTCC for more complicated things that they just didn't think of. And it just took time.” There was also a difference in use among younger and older officers and deputies, with Executive Staff #6 saying some simply “didn’t [grow] up with that [technology].”

To facilitate buy-in, Middle Manager #1 said, “all the agencies have incorporated coming to [the CRRTCC]—seeing it, hearing it, learning about it in their field training program. We do check-ons⁶ out there... If [the officers] don't know about it, it's because they haven't listened.” However, Officer #3 did not feel that the deputies or officers were properly trained on how to make the most of the CRRTCC, stating, “Every day, I'm finding out new things that they can do that I didn't know they could do before...for instance, I didn't know they had access to facial recognition.” While executive staff, middle management, and analysts reported buy-in to be high

⁶ “Check-ons” are regular meetings held by each of the law enforcement agencies before each shift. The meetings are attended by deputies or officers and their immediate supervisors to discuss assignments, concerns, on-going cases that will be dealt with or encountered during the shift.

and largely achieved through the analysts attending agency check-ons, sentiment was different among deputies and officers. For example, Officer #2, said, “I do think [the CRRTCC] could be more integrated, personally. I'd like to see them at our check-ons more. So that they know what we plan on getting into for the night or during our tour, what our goals and objectives are.”

Another mechanism to ensure officers and deputies are using the CRRTCC is by introducing them to it early on in their careers. For example, Executive Staff #6 said, “We talk about [the CRRTCC] when we when we bring them in the recruit class. And they tour the real time crime center when they're in our recruit orientation program.” Like attendance at check-ons, there was some difference in perception based on rank. Officer #2 said, “They give us a little once over on it, and I personally I didn't understand any of it.” There was support, however, across all ranks, for having deputies and officers visit the CRRTCC to observe operations and meet the analysts in-person at the center. Analyst #7 said, “I think bringing them out here to our center, showing them what we have the ability to do, letting them know...we can help you on just about any call that you're dealing with, and just making them aware of our ability.”

Despite stakeholders reporting somewhat slow integration and buy-in of the CRRTCC, at the time of the interviews, approximately 2.5 years after its opening, the CRRTCC was viewed as a crucial unit for the local law enforcement agencies. Middle Manager #2 said “the year before we had about 5,000 assists. We're over 8,000 this year. That tells [us] we were being used.” Analyst #1, said “Compared to the beginning...we're definitely relied on a lot more. And when we're not there, [the deputies and officers] get needy. They're like, where the heck is real time?”

Training

The importance of analyst training was mentioned 13 times by executive staff, 16 times by middle managers, 75 times by analysts, and 12 times by patrol officers and deputies. For the first year and a half of the CRRTCC's operation, there was no standard training program for analysts. The CRRTCC directors and analyst supervisors developed a training program, closely modeled after the law enforcement FTO program, that all newly hired analysts go through prior to working independently. The program takes about 8 weeks to complete and focuses on databases, policies, shadowing, on-the-job training, and court preparation. Importantly, the trainees are provided continual feedback about their progress. The training program ensures that all analysts receive the same training and are prepared to work with officers and deputies from all agencies. While the program was generally viewed as beneficial, some recommendations were offered. For example, Analyst #1 said, "I think to an extent, there's only so much you can learn from sitting behind someone and watching how they do things, but it's different when you're actually working alongside somebody."

Operations

Compared with the implementation process, executive staff discussed CRRTCC operations far less than the middle managers, analysts, deputies, and officers. Operational factors were raised only 41 times by executive staff, compared with 152 times by middle managers, 158 times by analysts, and 49 times by officers and deputies. Staffing, policies, and access to resources were identified as operational challenges.

Staffing and Policies

Consistent with law enforcement agencies across the country, the CRRTCC has experienced staffing shortages since its inception. Executive Staff #2 said, "Staffing is always

the biggest challenge.” Analyst #3 also said that attending agency check-ons has become more infrequent because “...with the staffing, I can't leave the center for a couple hours a day to go [to the check-ons] because there's no one in there with me.”

Interviewees regularly cited the benefits of the CRRTCC; noting that having multiple agencies come together was essential for meaningfully reducing crime. However, the multi-agency approach has not been without challenges. One of the most frequently mentioned operational concerns was differing policies across the agencies, which has created some confusion about direct authority within the center. Analyst #4 noted, “So, who has authority? Who are we listening to?” Policies also varied for technology use, according to Analyst #2, “For a while and even still a little bit, we had different agency policies about uses of certain technology.”

Stress

The negative impacts that job-related stress and trauma have on law enforcement officers have been well documented. However, less is understood about whether and to what extent job-related stress and trauma may have on real time crime center analysts. Stress was mentioned 6 times by middle managers and 58 times by analysts. Analyst #2 said, “Some people don't deal with it. Some people just try to bottle it up, and then it becomes an issue down the road. Every agency has their different wellness programs, [though].” While each agency has employee assistance programs that analysts can use, they are not always considered when discussing stress and its impacts. For example, Middle Manager #6 said, “They're the ones who are driving home in silence because of the day that they had and the experience that they had had and [are] having to process.”

Benefits of the CRRTCC

Benefits of the CRRTCC were mentioned 113 times by executive staff, 83 times by middle management, 48 times by real time crime center analysts, and 65 times by patrol officers and deputies. Interviewees most often described benefits related to improved operational efficiency and proactive policing, improvements in public and officer safety, and the value of the center as a regional asset. For example, Middle Manager #2 said the CRRTCC has allowed patrol officers and deputies “to be way more [pro]active instead of reactive to what's going on.” Executive staff and middle management also reported that the CRRTCC has reduced the amount of time it takes for deputies and officers to arrive on scene after receiving a call for service, and the associated benefits. For example, Middle Manager #7 said “...those seconds matter when especially when you're talking about life saving measures.”

Improved Public and Officer Safety

Improvements to public safety because of the CRRTCC were also frequently discussed by all ranks and positions. For example, Analyst #3 said, “I think the obvious success is crime being down and certain things being solved at a faster rate and the technologies we have to be able to do that.” Interviewees from all ranks and positions regularly said that the CRRTCC was intended to and has produced great benefits for officer safety. Executive Staff #1 said, “At the end of the day, that makes them safer... and that's a huge, huge responsibility that I have of trying to make sure we create the most safe environment we can possibly provide to them. And we can't always do that, but real time helps.”

Importantly, deputies and officers reported feeling as though they were safer because of the CRRTCC. For example, Officer #1 said, “Because RTCC is privy to information that we don't have readily available out on the street. And they're looking at screens with all the

integrated agencies, and they can see things happening around us that we're blind to.” Officer #3 said the CRRTCC contributes to their safety because the information they provide to deputies and officers allows them to make decisions prior to arriving on scene and approach scenes differently: “If you know a guy that has a history of carrying guns and when he's not allowed to, you might be like, okay. I need to make sure as I approach, I park really smart, make sure I have cover wherever I'm getting out, make sure there's no crossfire.”

Regional Asset

An additional stated benefit of the CRRTCC was that it is a regional asset—not only to be used by the contributing partners, but all law enforcement agencies in the area. Executive staff and middle managers described the lack of resources facing many of the smaller and rural counties’ law enforcement agencies in the area, which has required the CRRTCC to provide them with assistance. For example, Middle Manager #4 said, “we're surrounded by a lot of small rural agencies that don't have a lot of resources, quite frankly.”

Role of the CRRTCC Research Partnership and Research in Law Enforcement

The research partnership was mentioned 83 times by executive staff and 53 times by middle managers. Of note was that executive staff said the relationship with the research team was instrumental in the CRRTCC’s successful operation and impact. The most mentioned benefit of the research partnership was that it would allow for the identification of best practices and help inform decisions regarding asset location, what works, and policy development. Not only was the partnership viewed as beneficial for identifying best practices, Middle Manager #7 said that it also “affords us to be good stewards of the government resources.”

Interviewees also frequently mentioned that the partnership would lend credibility to the CRRTCC. For example, Middle Manager #3 believed that it would help increase “public trust

[because] we have oversight. We have independent oversight looking at things empirically” and helping to guide decisions. The significance of the research partnership, for not only the CRRTCC, but all of law enforcement was emphasized by Executive Staff #4, “The role of research in law enforcement is essential if law enforcement is to continuously improve and meet the challenges of contemporary society. The political obstacles, that we're going to face...are so big. I think one of the biggest issues is to track what seems to work, what doesn't.”

Community Engagement and Support

The role of community engagement and support for the CRRTCC was mentioned 104 times by executive staff, 42 times by middle managers, and 16 times by patrol officers and deputies. There was some initial hesitation and deliberation about what and how much of the CRRTCC’s functions should be made public. Despite what was shared, members of executive staff said there should be a focus on emphasizing the CRRTCC benefits for public safety.

Executive Staff #1 said, “Citizens are the police and police are the citizens, and we've gotta continuously make sure that we echo and send that message out. And, if it's working well, talk about it. If it's not working well, talk about it and talk about how we're gonna correct it.”

Executive Staff #4 said, “You don't wanna just throw technology on people. You want the people to have a voice in this. This is just this makes good public policy.” Leadership also believed that sharing information would help to improve community perceptions of law enforcement. For example, Middle Manager #2 said, “We may not be able to show all these databases but [we can] demonstrate that...we are abiding by the constitution, and we're not big brother.” Ultimately, the development and opening of the CRRTCC were publicized. However, Middle Manager #1 said, “I was very concerned about public engagement. But I think we found a happy medium, we did a couple of press releases, a grand opening... I think that was a good recipe.”

Limitations and Recommendations

There are several limitations to the qualitative assessment that warrant attention in future research. While all members of the agencies' executive staff and middle management who were involved in the CRRTCC implementation and operation were interviewed, those who were not directly involved (nor interviewed), may have different perspectives of the center's value and operations. Further, only a small sample of analysts and patrol officers and deputies were interviewed. Another limitation is that many interviewees viewed the CRRTCC as contributing to reductions in crime rates, increased case closures, and reduced response times. While the perceptions of benefit are certainly important, future research is needed to quantitatively assess the impacts of RTCCs on these domains.

The limitations notwithstanding, the interviews provided information about implementation, operation, community support, and the role of research, that could not be captured through quantitative assessments. Notably, the successful implementation of the CRRTCC was largely attributed to the unique longstanding relationships that many of the stakeholders had with each other and the closeness in which they worked on cases.

The interviews revealed different perspectives on various issues based on personnel rank and position. It may be important to have a systematic process for all stakeholders to provide insight to improve operations, use, and benefit. Officers and analysts were not directly involved in the implementation of the CRRTCC. Given that these groups are the beneficiaries and providers of the information, their perspectives may be useful in establishing policies and procedures. It would also help facilitate buy-in to offer deputies and officers more opportunities and incentives to visit the center and observe the analysts while they are working.

Finally, throughout the interviews, the research partnership emerged as a unique and beneficial component of the CRRTCC. Researchers and law enforcement leaders should proactively work together to establish similar partnerships where ideas are shared, meaningful evaluations are conducted, and operations are refined to enhance public and officer safety.

6.6 Public Transparency and Information Sharing

The technologies used in real time crime centers can raise questions about how these tools are used and how they affect privacy and civil liberties. Providing clear and accessible information about RTCC operations is therefore an important component of responsible implementation. In addition to documenting project activities through the evaluation described in this report, the project partners have made information about the CRRTCC publicly available through the Florida State University Real Time Crime Center Research & Policy Institute website (<https://criminology.fsu.edu/real-time-crime-center-research-policy-institute>).

The website provides an overview of the CRRTCC, including its purpose, participating agencies, and the technologies and information systems used to support officers and deputies during active incidents and investigations. It also includes an informational video describing the center and its partner agencies, which helps explain the role of the CRRTCC and the technologies it uses. The site also makes several reports from the CRRTCC research and evaluation publicly available. These include studies of community attitudes toward law enforcement technology and surveys of law enforcement personnel regarding their use of technology and perceptions of real time crime centers. Making these materials accessible provides residents, policymakers, and other stakeholders with direct access to information about the project and its evaluation.

In addition, the website includes summaries of CRRTCC operational activity intended to provide greater transparency about the center's day-to-day functions. These materials include figures summarizing analyst activities and assists, along with brief case examples showing how analysts have supported officers and deputies during active incidents through camera review, ALPR analysis, and database searches. These materials help illustrate how the technologies integrated within the CRRTCC are used in practice.

Taken together, these resources provide the public with accessible information about the purpose, operations, and evaluation of the CRRTCC. More broadly, they reflect an effort to promote transparency not only by describing the center, but also by providing concrete information about how it operates and how it has been studied.

7. Integration and Sustainability

The CRRTCC produced organizational changes that extend beyond the specific outcomes examined in this report. One of the most important was the shift from a model in which analytical support was often provided on an agency-specific or informal basis to one in which cross-agency support became more routine and institutionalized. By establishing a shared operational environment, the project helped create a structure through which analysts could more consistently assist incidents and investigations across participating jurisdictions.

The project also contributed to the development of a more formalized staffing and training model for real time analytical support. Participating agencies worked to align expectations related to analyst qualifications, supervision, and training, while the CRRTCC implemented a structured Analyst Training Program to prepare personnel to work in a fast-moving, multi-agency environment. These efforts strengthened the center's operational capacity and provided a more stable foundation for sustaining analytical support over time.

A broader organizational impact involved the strengthening of the CRRTCC as a regional institutional partnership. The project required agencies to coordinate not only around staffing, but also around shared governance, operational procedures, and access to core systems. In doing so, it helped formalize a regional model of intelligence sharing and support that extends beyond the capabilities of any one agency operating alone. The embedded research partnership also contributed to this process by providing a structure through which implementation challenges could be documented, assessed, and discussed as the center developed.

The implementation process also helped agencies identify and address practical issues related to technology integration, data sharing, and workflow. As the CRRTCC became operational, participating agencies worked through questions involving system access, vendor coordination, licensing, and interoperability across platforms. These efforts did not eliminate every challenge, but they improved the center's ability to operate as a more integrated analytical environment and positioned agencies to continue refining operations beyond the grant period.

Several of the most important elements of the CRRTCC are expected to continue after the grant period. Participating agencies have committed to sustaining the center's staffing model, maintaining shared technology platforms and licenses, and continuing the use of the CRRTCC as a regional intelligence resource. Because analysts remain agency employees while infrastructure and technology costs are distributed across partners, the center has a practical foundation for continued operation.

More broadly, the project appears to have strengthened the long-term viability of the CRRTCC by embedding shared analytical support, common workflows, and cross-agency coordination into routine practice. In that sense, the grant supported more than the creation of

new tools or short-term activities. It helped establish a more durable regional model for providing real time intelligence and investigative support across the Capital Region.

8. Summary and Conclusions

The SPI project supported the successful development, implementation, and evaluation of a multi-agency real time crime center serving the Capital Region. Over the course of the project, the CRRTCC evolved from a planned collaborative model into an operational regional intelligence center with shared staffing, integrated technologies, and routine cross-agency analytical support. One of the clearest accomplishments of the project was the movement from informal, case-by-case information sharing toward a more structured and sustained model of regional collaboration. The success of the CRRTCC was further documented in 2024 when the center was nationally recognized as the “real time crime center of the year” by the National Real Time Crime Center Association.

Findings from the process evaluation indicate that these organizational changes became embedded in day-to-day practice. Analyst after-shift reports documented substantial levels of support provided to partner agencies and outside agencies, and qualitative interviews reinforced that this collaboration was operational rather than merely formal. Across ranks and agencies, interviewees described improved communication, more immediate access to shared information, and fewer barriers to requesting assistance across jurisdictions. These findings suggest that the SPI project strengthened the routine functioning of real-time intelligence support across the region.

The outcome evaluation findings were more mixed, but the overall pattern is consistent with the CRRTCC’s operational logic. The clearest evidence of favorable change appeared in outcomes most closely tied to the center’s core functions, especially vehicle recoveries, motor

vehicle theft, and warrant arrests. Broader crime categories showed a more mixed pattern, and the evidence for officer safety outcomes was more limited. This more selective pattern is important because it aligns with the mechanisms through which a multi-agency RTCC would be expected to matter most: faster information development, vehicle and suspect identification, and more coordinated investigative response.

The project also produced important organizational impacts beyond the measured outcomes. The CRRTCC helped institutionalize a regional model of intelligence support, formalize shared workflows, strengthen analyst staffing and training, and improve integration across technologies and databases that had previously been more fragmented. The embedded research partnership further strengthened the connection between operations and evaluation, reinforcing a more evidence-based approach to ongoing refinement of policies, workflows, and technology use. In this sense, the organizational impact of SPI extended well beyond technology acquisition alone.

Several lessons emerged from implementation. First, successful multi-agency RTCC operations require more than co-location or shared interest. They depend on governance, shared access to core systems, workflow design, and sustained coordination across agencies. Second, staffing and training proved to be just as important as technology. The center's effectiveness depended not only on analytical tools, but also on developing a workforce capable of using those tools in a fast-moving, multi-agency environment and communicating useful intelligence to officers and investigators. Third, implementation required more adaptation than might initially be expected, particularly in areas involving interoperability, access arrangements, alert formats, and workflow design.

These lessons suggest several recommendations for agencies pursuing similar initiatives. Agencies considering a multi-agency RTCC should devote substantial attention early in implementation to data-sharing agreements, user access, interoperability, and workflow development rather than treating those issues as secondary to technology purchase or installation. They should also invest early in analyst recruitment, training, and supervision, and they should expect implementation to continue evolving after launch. Projects of this kind benefit from building in mechanisms for operational feedback, review, and adjustment from the outset.

The CRRTCC experience also suggests that real time crime centers are most valuable when they are designed around a clear operational logic and evaluated with realistic expectations. In this project, the strongest evidence of impact appeared in areas most closely tied to the center's ability to identify vehicles, generate leads quickly, support active incidents, and improve coordination across agencies. A real time crime center is unlikely to produce immediate or uniform effects across every crime type or operational outcome. Its greatest value may instead lie in improving the timeliness, coordination, and quality of intelligence support in specific parts of the investigative and response process.

With respect to technical assistance, the SPI experience underscores the importance of practical implementation support for agencies undertaking complex organizational change. For projects such as this one, assistance is most useful when it helps agencies translate broad goals into concrete decisions about governance, staffing, technology integration, workflow design, and evaluation. Multi-agency projects present challenges that are not always well addressed by tools or systems designed for single-agency environments, and agencies may benefit from technical assistance that is responsive to those realities. Guidance that helps agencies anticipate

interoperability problems, staffing demands, and coordination challenges may be especially valuable during both planning and implementation.

Based on this experience, one recommendation for BJA is to continue supporting SPI projects that combine technological innovation with strong implementation and evaluation components. The CRRTCC experience suggests that the value of SPI lies not only in supporting new technologies, but also in helping agencies develop the organizational capacity needed to use those technologies effectively. Future SPI efforts may be especially beneficial when they support the full implementation process, including governance development, cross-agency coordination, analyst workforce development, and embedded evaluation.

Overall, the CRRTCC demonstrates the potential of a multi-agency, research-informed model of real-time intelligence support. The project strengthened regional collaboration, expanded the routine use of data and intelligence during incidents and investigations, and created a foundation for continued evidence-based refinement of operations over time. Although implementation required substantial coordination and adaptation, the findings suggest that the SPI project produced meaningful organizational gains and encouraging outcome improvements in several areas most closely tied to the center's intended functions.

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Appendix

Appendix Tables A1–A4 present the full model estimates for the interrupted time series analyses described in the evaluation section. These tables report coefficient estimates and standard errors for each model, including parameters representing pre-intervention trends, level changes at the CRRTCC soft and grand openings, and changes in trends following those interventions. Monthly indicator variables were included in all models to account for seasonality but are not shown in the tables.

Appendix Table A1. Interrupted Time Series Models Predicting Vehicle Recovery Rate and Motor Vehicle Theft

	Vehicle Recovery Rate		Motor Vehicle Theft	
	Soft opening	Grand opening	Soft opening	Grand opening
Monthly trend before intervention	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.001)	0.009* (0.004)	0.007* (0.003)
Level change at soft opening	0.070* (0.034)		0.067 (0.072)	
Change in trend after soft opening	0.008** (0.002)		-0.028** (0.005)	
Level change at grand opening		0.050 (0.033)		-0.009 (0.063)
Change in trend after grand opening		0.004 (0.002)		-0.030** (0.005)
Intercept	-0.187** (0.038)	-0.237** (0.034)	4.200** (0.080)	4.223** (0.066)
N of months	56	56	56	56
Post-intervention monthly trend	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.018 (0.003)	-0.023 (0.004)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Models estimated using Poisson regression with robust standard errors. Unit of analysis is the month. Models include monthly indicator variables to account for seasonality; coefficients for these variables are not shown.

Appendix Table A2. Interrupted Time Series Models Predicting Warrant and Custodial Arrests

	Warrant Arrests		Custodial Arrests	
	Soft opening	Grand opening	Soft opening	Grand opening
Monthly trend before intervention	-0.016** (0.005)	-0.020** (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
Level change at soft opening	-0.137 (0.102)		0.032 (0.036)	
Change in trend after soft opening	0.038** (0.006)		-0.004 (0.002)	
Level change at grand opening		0.360** (0.087)		-0.034 (0.045)
Change in trend after grand opening		0.034** (0.006)		-0.004 (0.003)
Intercept	-4.266** (0.122)	-4.234** (0.114)	-1.565** (0.059)	-1.578** (0.051)
N of months	56	56	56	56
Post-intervention monthly trend	0.022** (0.003)	0.013** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Models estimated using Poisson regression with robust standard errors. Unit of analysis is the month. Models include monthly indicator variables to account for seasonality; coefficients for these variables are not shown.

Appendix Table A3. Interrupted Time Series Models Predicting Assaults on Officers and Deputies

	Assaults	
	Soft opening	Grand opening
Monthly trend before intervention	0.024 (0.013)	0.005 (0.006)
Level change at soft opening	-0.859** (0.291)	
Change in trend after soft opening	0.003 (0.017)	
Level change at grand opening		-1.108** (0.342)
Change in trend after grand opening		0.065** (0.020)
Intercept	1.431** (0.424)	1.807** (0.338)
N of months	56	56
Post-intervention monthly trend	0.027** (0.010)	0.070** (0.018)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Models estimated using Poisson regression with robust standard errors. Unit of analysis is the month. Models include monthly indicator variables to account for seasonality; coefficients for these variables are not shown.

Appendix Table A4. Interrupted Time Series Models Predicting Crimes Against Property, Society, and Persons

	Crimes Against Property		Crimes Against Society		Crimes Against Persons	
	Soft opening	Grand opening	Soft opening	Grand opening	Soft opening	Grand opening
Monthly trend before intervention	0.007** (0.002)	0.006** (0.001)	0.019** (0.004)	0.008** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)
Level change at soft opening	0.057 (0.038)		-0.253** (0.077)		0.004 (0.029)	
Change in trend after soft opening	-0.007** (0.002)		-0.023** (0.005)		-0.003 (0.002)	
Level change at grand opening		0.108** (0.032)		-0.235** (0.083)		-0.049* (0.023)
Change in trend after grand opening		-0.011** (0.002)		-0.008 (0.005)		-0.002 (0.001)
Intercept	6.984** (0.073)	6.982** (0.050)	5.299** (0.113)	5.468** (0.086)	6.247** (0.038)	6.244** (0.033)
N of months	56	56	56	56	56	56
Post-intervention monthly trend	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Models estimated using Poisson regression with robust standard errors. Unit of analysis is the month. Models include monthly indicator variables to account for seasonality; coefficients for these variables are not shown.

Appendix Table A5. Event Study Models for Motor Vehicle Theft and Vehicle Recovery Rate

	Stolen Vehicles	Recovery Rate
1 Year Before Installation	.3685* (.180)	-.0214 (.069)
9 Months Before Installation	.5500** (.195)	-.1263 (.088)
6 Months Before Installation	.3424* (.165)	-.1568 (.110)
3 Months Before Installation	.1510 (.115)	.0126 (.118)
Installation Quarter (Months 0–2)	.5188** (.139)	.0055 (.079)
3 Months After Installation	-.0478 (.142)	-.1412 (.138)
6 Months After Installation	.2637** (.084)	-.1241 (.094)
9 Months After Installation	.0843 (.124)	-.1484 (.142)
1 Year After Installation	.6436 (.387)	.1362 (.094)
15 Months After Installation	-.2456** (.091)	.3015** (.053)
Controls		
% Black	.0019* (.001)	.0002 (.000)
% Latino	.0025 (.005)	.0029 (.003)
% Poverty	-.0003 (.002)	-.0001 (.001)
% Below B.A. degree	-.0014 (.002)	.0000 (.001)
% Homeowner	-.0012 (.001)	.0000 (.001)
% Vacant units	.0056 (.003)	-.0010 (.001)
Other cameras	-.0170 (.011)	-.0018 (.004)
Monthly Analyst Hours	-.0000 (.000)	-.0000 (.000)
Intercept	.3055* (.127)	.7106** (.096)
<i>N</i>	1,223	1,223

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Models estimated using negative binomial regression with cluster-robust standard errors. Unit of analysis is census block group by quarter.